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Abstract The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of
definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate syn-
chronously with awareness of the global clock. This enables timing based attacks to be captured, whereas
previous work on this topic has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems. Versions of the notions of nond-
educibility on inputs, nondeducibility on strategies, and an unwinding based notion are formulated for this
model. All three notions are shown to be decidable, and their computational complexity is characterised.
1 Introduction
Information flow security is concerned with the ability of agents in a system to deduce information about
the activity and secrets of other agents. An information flow security policy prohibits some agents from
knowing information about other agents. In an insecure system, an agent may nevertheless be able to
make inferences from its observations, that enables it to deduce facts that it is not permitted to know.
In particular, a class of system design flaws, referred to as covert channels, provide unintended ways for
information to flow between agents, rendering a system insecure.
Defining what it is for a system to satisfy an information flow security policy has proved to be a subtle
matter. A substantial literature has developed that provides a range of formal systems models and a range of
definitions of security. In particular, in non-deterministic systems it has been found necessary to clarify the
attack model, and distinguish between a passive attacker, which merely aims to deduce secret information
from observations it is able to make from its position outside the security domain to be protected, and a
more active attacker, that may have planted a Trojan Horse in the domain to be protected, and which seeks
to use covert channels to pass information out of this domain. While this distinction turns out not to matter
in asynchronous systems [FG95], in synchronous settings, it leads to two different definitions of security,
known as Nondeducibility on Inputs (NDI) [Sut86], and Nondeducibility on Strategies (NDS) [WJ90]. (The
term strategies in the latter refers to the strategies that a Trojan Horse may employ to pass information
out of the security domain.) Considerations of proof methods for security, and compositionality of these
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methods, has led to the introduction of further definitions of security, such as unwinding relations [GM84]
and the associated definition of restrictiveness (RES) [McC88].
One of the dimensions along which it makes sense to evaluate a definition of security is the practicality
of verification techniques it enables. The early literature on the topic was motivated primarily by theorem
proving verification methods, but in recent years the feasibility of automated verification techniques has
begun to be investigated [DHK+08,FG95,FG96,FGM00,KB06,vdMZ07]. This recent work on automated
verification of security has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems models.
Our Contribution In this paper we investigate the complexity of automated verification for a range of
definitions of information flow in a synchronous systems model, in which agents are aware of a global clock
and may use timing information in their deductions. This model is significant in that a number of timing-
based attacks have been demonstrated that, e.g., enable cryptographic keys to be deduced just from the
amount of time taken to perform cryptographic operations [Koc96]. It is therefore desirable that systems
designs are free of timing-based covert channels; the asynchronous definitions of security that have been
the focus of much of the literature fail to ensure this.
We study three definitions of security in this paper: synchronous versions of Nondeducibility on Inputs
(NDI), Nondeducibility on Strategies (NDS) and an unwinding based definition called Restrictiveness (RES).
We consider just a two-agent setting, with agents L for a low security domain and H for a high security
domain, and the (classical) security policy that permits H to know about L’s activity, but prohibits L from
knowing about the activity of H. We show that all three definitions are decidable in finite state systems, and
with complexities of PSPACE-complete for NDI, EXPSPACE-complete for NDS, and polynomial time for
RES. A preliminary version of this paper, with only proof sketches, appeared in [CMZ10]. In this extended
version, we provide detailed proofs for all results.
Outline of the paper The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our systems model,
the definitions of security that we study, and states the main results of the paper. The following sections
discuss the proofs of these results. Section 3 deals with Nondeducibility on Inputs, Section 4 deals with
Nondeducibility on Strategies, and Section 5 deals with the unwinding-based definition. Related literature
is discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 makes some concluding remarks.
2 Notations, Semantic Model and Information Flows Security Policies
2.1 Notation
Otherwise stated, we use standard notation from automata theory. Given a finite set (alphabet) A, we write
A∗ for the set of finite words over A. We denote the empty word by , and for w ∈ A∗, we write |w| for the
length of w. For n ∈ N, An stands for the set of words of length n over A.
2.2 Synchronous Machines
We work with a synchronous, non-deterministic state machine model for two agents, H and L. At each step
of the computation, the agents (simultaneously) perform an action, which is resolved non-deterministically
into a state transition. Both agents make (possibly incomplete) observations of the state of the system, and
do so with awareness of the time. Time is discrete and measured by the number of steps in a computation.
Our machine model is given in the following definition. We do not make any finiteness assumptions in
this section and the results in this section hold for this unconstrained model.
Definition 1 (Synchronous Machine) A synchronous machine M is a tuple of the form 〈S,A, s0,→,
O, obs〉 where
– S is the set of states,
– A = AH × AL is a set of joint actions (or joint inputs), each composed of an action of H from the set
AH and an action of L from the set AL,
– s0 is the initial state,
– →⊆ S ×A× S defines state transitions resulting from the joint actions,
– O is a set of observations,
– obs : S × {H,L} → O represents the observations made by each agent in each state.
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We write obsu for the mapping obs(·, u) : S → O, and s a−−→ s′ for 〈s, a, s′〉 ∈→. We assume that machines
are input-enabled, by requiring that for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A, there exists s′ ∈ S such that s a−−→ s′. We
write Ms for the set of synchronous machines.
A run r of M is a finite sequence r = s0a1s1 . . . ansn with: ai ∈ A and si ai+1−−−→ si+1 for all i = 0 . . . n− 1.
We write R(M) for the set of all runs of M . We denote the sequence of joint actions a1 . . . an in the run r
by Act(r). For each agent u ∈ {H,L} we define proju : A→ Au to be the projection of joint actions onto
agent u’s actions. We write Actu(r) for the sequence of agent u’s actions in Act(r), e.g., if Act(r) = a1 . . . an
then Actu(r) = proju(a1) . . . proju(an).
2.3 Agent Views
For a sequence w, and 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|, we write wi for the i-th element of w, and w[i] for the prefix of w up
to the i-th element. We assume agents have a synchronous view of the machine, making an observation at
each moment of time and being aware of each of their own actions (but not the actions of the other agent,
which are given simultaneously and independently). Given a synchronous machine M , and u ∈ {H,L}, we
define u views by the mapping viewu : R(M)→ O(AuO)∗ by:
viewu(s0a1s1a2 · · · ansn) = obsu(s0) proju(a1) obsu(s1) proju(a2) · · · proju(an) obsu(sn).
Intuitively, this says that an agent’s view of a run is the history of all its state observations as well as its
own actions in the run. We say that a sequence v of observations and actions is a possible u view in a system
M if there exists a run r of M such that v = viewu(r). The mapping viewu extends straightforwardly to
sets of runs R ⊆ R(M), by viewu(R) = {viewu(r) | r ∈ R}. We define the length |v| of a view v to be the
number of actions it contains.
2.4 Expressiveness Issues
We remark that the model is sufficiently expressive to represent an alternate model in which agents act
in turn under the control of a scheduler. We say that a synchronous machine is scheduled if for each state
s ∈ S either
– for all actions a ∈ AH and b, b′ ∈ AL, and states t ∈ S, s (a,b)−−−→ t iff s (a,b
′)−−−−→ t, or
– for all actions a, a′ ∈ AH and b ∈ AL, and states t ∈ S, s (a,b)−−−→ t iff s (a
′,b)−−−−→ t.
This definition says that state transitions in a scheduled machine are determined by the actions of at most
one of the agents (the agent scheduled at that state); the other agent has no control over the transition.
The model involving machines under the control of a scheduler of [vdMZ08], in which at most one agent
acts at each step of the computation, can be encoded as scheduled synchronous machines.
2.5 Notions of Information Flow Security
We consider a number of different notions of information flow security. Each definition provides an inter-
pretation for the security policy L → H, which states that information is permitted to flow from L to H,
but not from H to L. Our definitions are intended for synchronous systems, in which the agents share a
clock and are able to make deductions based on the time. (Much of the prior literature has concentrated on
asynchronous systems, in which an agent may not know how many actions another agent has performed.)
2.5.1 Non-Deducibility on Inputs
The first definition we consider states that L should not be able to infer H actions from its view.
Definition 2 A synchronous machine M satisfies Non-Deducibility on Inputs (M ∈ NDI) if for every
possible L view v in M and every sequence of H actions α ∈ A∗H with |α| = |v|, there exists a run
r ∈ R(M) such that ActH(r) = α and viewL(r) = v.
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Fig. 1 A synchronous machine in NDI, but not in NDS, where x ∈ {0, 1}.
Intuitively, in a synchronous system, L always knows how many actions H has performed, since this is
always identical to the number of actions that L has itself performed. In particular, if L has made view
v, then L knows that H has performed |v| actions. The definition says that the system is secure if this is
all that L can learn about what sequence of actions H has performed. Whatever L observes is consistent
with any sequence of actions by H of this length1. More precisely, define KL(v) for an L view v to be the
set of H action sequences ActH(r) for r a run with v = viewL(r); this represents what L knows about H’s
actions in the run. Then M ∈ NDI iff for all possible L views v we have KL(v) = A|v|H .
The definition of NDI takes the viewpoint that a system is secure if it is not possible for L to make
any nontrivial deductions about H behaviour, provided that H does not actively seek to communicate
information to L. This is an appropriate definition when H is trusted not to deliberately act so as to
communicate information to L, and the context is one where H is equally likely to engage in any of
its possible behaviours. In some circumstances, however, NDI proves to be too weak a notion of security.
In particular, this is the case if the attack model against which the system must be secure includes the
possibility of Trojan Horses at the H end of the system, which must be prevented from communicating
H secrets to L. The following example, due in essence to Wittbold and Johnson [WJ90] shows that it is
possible for a system to satisfy NDI, but still allow for L to deduce H information.
Example 1 We present a synchronous machine that satisfies NDI in Fig. 1. We use the convention in such
figures that the observations are shown on a state s in the form of obsH(s)/obsL(s). Edges are labelled
with joint actions (a, a′) where a ∈ AH and a′ ∈ AL. When a is x this means that there is such an edge for
all a ∈ AH . In this example the action sets are AH = {0, 1}, AL = {0}. Note that in state s1 and s2, L’s
observation in the next state is determined as the exclusive-or of H’s current observation and H’s action.
The system is in NDI since every H action sequence is compatible with every L view of the same length.
For example, the L view 00000 is consistent with H action sequence 00 and 10 (path s0s1s3) and with H
action sequence 01 and 11 (path s0s2s3). Nevertheless, H can communicate a bit b of information to L, as
follows. Note that H is able to distinguish between state s1 and s2 by means of the observation it makes
on these states (at time 1). Suppose b = 1, then H chooses action 1 at s1 and action 0 at s2; in either case
the next state is s4, and L observes 1. Alternately, if b = 0, then H chooses action 0 at s1 and action 1 at
s2; in either case the next state is s3, and L observes 0. Whatever the value of b, H has guaranteed that
L observes b at time 2, so this bit has been communicated. Intuitively, this means that the system fails to
block Trojan Horses at H from communicating with L, even though it satisfies NDI. (The structure can be
repeated so that H can communicate a message of any length to L in plain text.) uunionsq
2.5.2 Non-Deducibility on Strategies
The essence of Example 1 is that L is able to deduce H secrets based not just on its knowledge of the
system, but also its knowledge that H is following a particular strategy for communication of information to
L. In response to this example, Wittbold and Johnson proposed the following stronger definition of security
that they called non-deducibility on strategies. To state this definition, we first formalize the possible
communication strategies that can be used by H. Intuitively, H’s behaviour may depend on what H has
been able to observe in the system.
Definition 3 (H Strategy, Consistent Runs) An H strategy in M is a function pi : viewH(R(M)) →
AH mapping each possible view of H (in M) to an H action. A run r = s0a1s1 . . . ansn of M is consistent
1 Recall that M is input-enabled.
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with an H strategy pi if for all i = 0 . . . n− 1, we have projH(ai+1) = pi(viewH(s0a1s1 . . . aisi)). We write
R(M,pi) for the set of runs of M that are consistent with the H strategy pi.
We can now state Wittbold and Johnson’s definition.
Definition 4 A synchronous system M satisfies Nondeducibility on Strategies (M ∈ NDS), if for all H
strategies pi1, pi2 in M , we have viewL(R(M,pi1)) = viewL(R(M,pi2)).
Intuitively, this definition says that the system is secure if L is not able to distinguish between different
H strategies by means of its views. In Example 1, given an H strategy pi1 satisfying pi1(0x0) = 0 and
pi1(0x1) = 1, and another H strategy pi2 satisfying pi2(0x0) = 1 and pi2(0x1) = 0, we have the L view 00001
in viewL(R(M,pi2) but not in viewL(R(M,pi1)). Thus, the sets of L views differ for these two strategies,
so the system is not in NDS.
An alternate formulation of the definition can be obtained by noting that for every possible L view v,
there is an H strategy pi such that v ∈ viewL(R(M,pi)), viz., if v = viewL(r), we take pi to be a strategy
that always performs the same action at each time i < |r| as H performs at time i in r. Thus, we can state
the definition as follows:
Proposition 1 M ∈ NDS iff for all H strategies pi in M , we have viewL(R(M,pi)) = viewL(R(M)).
Proof It is trivial that if viewL(R(M,pi)) = viewL(R(M)) for all strategies pi then M ∈ NDS. Conversely,
suppose that M ∈ NDS, and let pi be any strategy. Plainly viewL(R(M,pi)) ⊆ viewL(R(M)); we show the
reverse containment. Let v ∈ viewL(R(M)) be a possible L view. By the above observation there exists
a strategy pi1 such that v ∈ viewL(R(M,pi1)). By M ∈ NDS, viewL(R(M,pi1)) = viewL(R(M,pi)), so also
v ∈ viewL(R(M,pi)), as required. uunionsq
This formulation makes it clear that H cannot communicate any information to L by means of its
strategies. It is also apparent that allowing H strategies to be non-deterministic (i.e., functions from H
views to a set of H actions) would not lead to a different definition of NDS, since the more choices H has in
a strategy the more L-views are compatible with that strategy. We remark that in asynchronous systems
(in which we use an asynchronous notion of view), similarly defined notions of non-deducibility on inputs
and non-deducibility on strategies turn out to be equivalent [FG95,vdMZ10]. The example 1 above shows
that this is not the case in synchronous machines, where the two notions are distinct.
2.5.3 Unwinding Relations
Nondeducibility-based definitions of security are quite intuitive, but they turn out to have some disad-
vantages as a basis for secure systems development. One is that they are not compositional: combining
two systems, each secure according to such a definition, can produce a compound system that is not se-
cure [McC88]. For this reason, some stronger, but less intuitive definitions have been advocated in the
literature.
One of these, McCullough’s notion of restrictiveness [McC88], is closely related to an approach to formal
proof of systems security based on what are known as “unwinding relations.” A variety of definitions of
unwinding relations have been proposed in the literature [GM84,Rus92,Man00b,BFPR03], in the context
of a number of different underlying systems models and associated definitions of security for which they
are intended to provide a proof technique. We propose here a variant of such definitions that is appropriate
to the machine model we consider in this paper, drawing on definitions proposed by van der Meyden and
Zhang [vdMZ08] for machines acting under the control of a scheduler.
Definition 5 (Synchronous Unwinding Relation) A synchronous unwinding relation on a system M
is a symmetric relation ∼⊆ S × S satisfying the following:
1. s0 ∼ s0,
2. s ∼ t implies obsL(s) = obsL(t), and
3. s ∼ t implies that for all a1, a2 ∈ AH and a3 ∈ AL, if s (a1,a3)−−−−−→ s′ then there exists a state t′ such that
t
(a2,a3)−−−−−→ t′, and s′ ∼ t′.
Intuitively, an unwinding relation is a bisimulation-like relation over S that shows L observations are
locally uncorrelated with H actions.
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Fig. 2 A synchronous machine M in NDS, but not in RES, where x ∈ {0, 1}. Every state s is labelled with a pair
obsH(s)/obsL(s).
Definition 6 A synchronous machine M satisfies restrictiveness (M ∈ RES), if there exists a synchronous
unwinding relation on M .
Part of the significance of RES is that it provides a proof technique for our notions of nondeducibility,
as shown by the following result, which relates the three notions of security we have introduced:
Theorem 1 The following containments hold and are strict: RES ⊂ NDS ⊂ NDI.
Proof To show that RES ⊆ NDS we argue as follows. Suppose that ∼ is a synchronous unwinding on M .
Let v be any possible L view, and pi any H strategy. We have to show that v ∈ viewL(R(M,pi)). For
this, let r = s0a1s1 . . . ansn be a run such that v = viewL(r). We show that there exists a run r
′ =
s′0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
ns
′
n consistent with pi such that v = viewL(r
′). We proceed inductively, showing for each
i = 0 . . . n that viewL(s0a1s1 . . . aisi) = viewL(s
′
0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
i) and si ∼ s′i, where s′0a′1s′1 . . . a′is′i is a run
consistent with pi. In the base case, we have s′0 = s0 and the claim is trivial. For the inductive case,
let a = pi(viewH(s
′
0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
i)) and b = projL(ai+1), and take a
′
i+1 = (a, b). Since projL(ai+1) =
projL(a
′
i+1) and ∼ is an unwinding relation, there exists a state s′i+1 such that s′i
a′i+1−−−→ s′i+1 and si+1 ∼
s′i+1. Further, we conclude that obsL(si+1) = obsL(s
′
i+1). Since s
′
0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
i is consistent with pi, so is
s′0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
ia
′
i+1s
′
i+1, and
viewL(s
′
0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
ia
′
i+1s
′
i+1) = viewL(s
′
0a
′
1s
′
1 . . . a
′
is
′
i)projL(a
′
i+1)obsL(s
′
i+1)
= viewL(s0a1s1 . . . aisi)projL(ai+1)obsL(si+1)
= viewL(s0a1s1 . . . aisiai+1si+1) ,
as required.
Next we show that NDS ⊆ NDI. Let α ∈ A∗H and v be an L observation satisfying |α| = |v|. We construct
a “blind” H strategy pi as pi(v′) = α|v′|+1 if |v′| < |α| and pi(v′) = aH otherwise, where aH is an arbitrary
action in AH . Since M ∈ NDS, we have viewL(R(M,pi)) = viewL(R(M)), so there exists a run r ∈ R(M,pi)
such that viewL(r) = v. By the construction of pi we have ActH(r) = α.
That the inclusions are strict follows from Example 1 and Example 2 below. uunionsq
Example 2 We present a machine in Fig. 2 that satisfies NDS but does not satisfy RES. In this system we
let AH = {0, 1}, AL = {0}. We use the conventions from Example 1. One may easily observe that the set
of L views is given by the regular language 000((00)∗ + (01)∗) and all the views are compatible with every
possible H strategy. However, there does not exist a synchronous unwinding relation. Suppose there were
such a relation ∼. Then s0 ∼ s0, and for joint actions (0, 0) and (1, 0), we have s0 (0,0)−−−→ s1, s0 (1,0)−−−→ s2
and s0
(1,0)−−−→ s3, and we would require s1 to be related to either s2 or s3. However, neither s2 nor s3 can be
related to s1: from s2 user L can only observe (00)
∗ in the future, and from s3 only (01)∗ can be observed
by L. Note from s1 both (00)
∗ and (01)∗ are possible for L. uunionsq
In the following sections, we study the complexity of the notions of security we have defined above.
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3 Synchronous Nondeducibility on Inputs
In this section we establish the following result:
Theorem 2 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, NDI is PSPACE-complete with respect to
logspace reductions.
3.1 PSPACE-Easiness
Stating the definition in the negative, a system is not in NDI if there exists an L view v and a sequence of
H actions α with |α| = |v| such that there exists no run r with ActH(r) = α and viewL(r) = v. We show
that NDI is decidable by a procedure that searches for such an L view v and H action sequence α. The key
element of the proof is to show that we need to maintain only a limited amount of information during this
search, so that we can bound the length of the witness (v, α), and the amount of space needed to show that
such a witness exists.
To show this, suppose we are given a machine M = 〈S,A, s0,→, O, obs〉. Given a sequence α ∈ A∗H and
a sequence v ∈ O(ALO)∗, we define the set K(α, v) to be the set of all final states of runs r of M consistent
with α and v, i.e., such that ActH(r) = α and viewL(r) = v. For each a ∈ AH , b ∈ AL and o ∈ O, we also
define the function δa,b,o : P(S)→ P(S), by
δa,b,o(T ) = {t ∈ S | for some t′ ∈ T we have t′ (a,b)−−−→ t and obsL(t) = o} .
For the system M define the labelled transition system LTS(M) = (Q,Σ, q0,⇒) as follows:
1. Q = S × P(S),
2. q0 = (s0, {s0}),
3. Σ = AH ×AL ×AH ,
4. ⇒⊆ Q×Σ ×Q is the labelled transition relation defined by (s, T )⇒(a,b,a′) (s′, T ′) if a ∈ AH , b ∈ AL,
a′ ∈ AH such that s (a,b)−−−→ s′ and T ′ = δa′,b,obsL(s′)(T ).
Intuitively, the component s in a state (s, T ) ∈ Q is used to ensure that we generate an L view v that is
in fact possible. The components a, b in a transition (s, T ) ⇒(a,b,a′) (s′, T ′) represent the actions used to
generate the run underlying v, and the component a′ is used to generate a sequence α. The set T represents
K(α, v). More precisely, we have the following result:
Lemma 1 If q0 ⇒(a1,b1,a′1) (s1, T1) ⇒ · · · ⇒(an,bn,a′n) (sn, Tn), then the sequence v = obsL(s0)b1obsL(s1)
. . . bnobsL(sn) is a possible L view, and α = a
′
1 . . . a
′
n is a sequence of H actions such that |v| = |α| and
K(α, v) = Tn.
Conversely, for every possible L view v with |v| = n, and sequence of H actions α = a′1 . . . a′n, there exists
a path q0 ⇒(a1,b1,a′1) (s1, T1) ⇒ · · · ⇒(an,bn,a′n) (sn, Tn) such that v = obsL(s0)b1obsL(s1) . . . bnobsL(sn)
and K(α, v) = Tn.
Proof We first show that for all α ∈ A∗H , v ∈ O(ALO)∗, a ∈ AH , b ∈ AL and o ∈ O, we have K(αa, vbo) =
δa,b,o(K(α, v)). To show K(αa, vbo) ⊆ δa,b,o(K(α, v)), suppose that t ∈ K(αa, vbo). Then there exists a run
r of M such that ActH(r) = αa and viewL(r) = vbo and the final state of r is t. It follows that obsL(t) = o.
Thus, we may write r = r′
(a,b)−−−→ t, where ActH(r′) = α, and viewL(r′) = v. Thus, the final state t′ of r′ is
in K(α, v). Since t′
(a,b)−−−→ t and obsL(t) = o, it follows that t ∈ δa,b,o(K(α, v)).
Conversely, if t ∈ δa,b,o(K(α, v)) then by definition of δa,b,o there exists t′ ∈ K(α, v) such that t′ (a,b)−−−→ t
and obsL(t) = o. By definition of K(α, v) there exists a run r of M such that ActH(r) = α and viewL(r) = v.
Taking r′ = r
(a,b)−−−→ t, we see that r′ is a run of M with ActH(r) = αa and viewL(r′) = vbo. Thus,
t ∈ K(αa, vbo), as required. This completes the proof that K(αa, vbo) = δa,b,o(K(α, v)).
We can now prove the two parts of the result:
– Suppose q0 ⇒(a1,b1,a′1) (s1, T1) ⇒ · · · ⇒(an,bn,a′n) (sn, Tn) is a run of LTS(M), then by definition r =
s0
(a1,b1)−−−−→ s1 (a2,b2)−−−−→ . . . (an,bn)−−−−−→ sn is a run ofM , such that viewL(r) = obsL(s0)b1obsL(s1) . . . bnobsL(sn) =
v is a possible L view. Moreover, Ti+1 = δai,bi,obsL(si+1)(Ti) for i = 0 . . . n − 1, where we take
T0 = {s0}. Since T0 = K(ε, obsL(s0)), it follows from the above using a straightforward induction
that Tn = K(α, v), where α = a
′
1 . . . a
′
n.
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– Let v be a possible L view, then there exists a run r = s0
(a1,b1)−−−−→ s1 (a2,b2)−−−−→ . . . (an,bn)−−−−−→ sn of M such
that viewL(r) = v. Given a sequence of H actions α = a
′
1 . . . a
′
n, we inductively define T0 = {s0} and
Ti+1 = δai,bi,obsL(si+1)(Ti). It is then immediate by definition that we have a path (s0, {s0})⇒(a1,b1,a
′
1)
(s1, T1)⇒ · · · ⇒(an,bn,a′n) (sn, Tn) in LTS(M). By a straightforward induction using what was proved
above, we have that Tn = K(α, v), where α = a
′
1 . . . a
′
n and v = obsL(s0)b1obsL(s1) . . . bnobsL(sn). uunionsq
We now note that for an H action sequence α and a possible L view v, with |v| = |α|, there exists no run r
such that ActH(r) = α and viewL(r) = v iff K(α, v) = ∅. The existence of such a pair (α, v), is therefore
equivalent, by Lemma 1, to the existence of a path in LTS(M) from q0 to a state (s, T ) with T = ∅. This
can be decided in NSPACE(O(|M |)) = DSPACE(O(|M |2)) ⊆ PSPACE. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 3 M ∈ NDI is decidable in PSPACE.
We note, moreover, that since there are at most |S| × 2|S| states in Q, if there exists a pair (α, v)
witnessing that M 6∈ NDI there exists such a pair with |α| ≤ |S| × 2|S|.
3.2 PSPACE-Hardness
We show that NDI is PSPACE-hard already in the special case of scheduled machines. The proof is by a
polynomial time reduction from the problem of deciding, given a non-deterministic finite state automaton A
on alphabet Σ, if the language L(A) accepted by A is equal to Σ∗. This Universality problem is PSPACE-
hard [SM73].
Let A = 〈Q,Q0, Σ, δ, F 〉 be a non-deterministic finite state automaton (without ε-transitions), with
states Q, initial states Q0 ⊆ Q, alphabet Σ, transition function δ : Q × Σ → P(Q), and final states F .
We define M(A) = 〈S,A, s0,→, obs, O〉 to be a scheduled machine, and use a function sched : S → {H,L}
to indicate the agent (if any) whose actions determine transitions. In view of this, when sched(s) = u
and a ∈ Au, we may write s a−→ t to represent that s b−→ t for all joint actions b with proju(b) = a. The
components of M(A) are defined as follows.
– S = Q ∪ {s0, s1, s2, s3}, where Q ∩ {s0, s1, s2, s3} = ∅,
– sched(s0) = H and sched(s) = L for all s ∈ S \ {s0},
– A = AH ∪AL where AL = Σ and AH = {h, h′},
– O = {0, 1},
– obs : {H,L} × S → O with obsH(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S and obsL(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S \ {s2}, and
obsL(s2) = 1.
– −→⊆ S ×A×S is defined as consisting of the following transitions (using the convention noted above)
– s0
h−−→ q for all q ∈ Q0,
– s0
h−−→ s2, provided Q0 ∩ F 6= ∅,
– s0
h′−−→ s1 and s0 h
′−−→ s2,
– s1
a−−→ s1 and s1 a−−→ s2 for all a ∈ Σ,
– s2
a−−→ s2 for all a ∈ Σ,
– s3
a−−→ s3 for all a ∈ Σ,
– for q, q′ ∈ Q and a ∈ AL = Σ we have q a−−→ q′ for all q′ ∈ δ(q, a)
– for q ∈ Q and a ∈ AL = Σ such that δ(q, a) ∩ F 6= ∅, we have q a−−→ s2,
– for q ∈ Q and a ∈ AL = Σ such that δ(q, a) = ∅, we have q a−−→ s3.
The construction of M(A) from A can be done in logspace.
Intuitively, the runs of M(A) produce two sets of L views, depending on whether the first H action
is h or h′. In all circumstances, runs in which H does h′ in the first step, with the first transition to s1,
produce an L view for each sequence in 0Σ1(Σ1)∗ or 0Σ0(Σ0)∗(Σ1)∗ by switching from to s2 at the first
occurrence of observation 1. Runs in which H does h in the first step with a transition to a state in Q0,
correspond to simulations of A and produce two types of L views:
1. any sequence in 0Σ0(Σ0)∗ (by means of a run that stays in Q for as long as possible, and moves to s3
whenever an action is not enabled), and
2. any sequence of the form 0Σ0b10 . . . bn−10bn1(Σ1)∗ with b1 . . . bn ∈ L(A) (these come from runs that
pass through Q and then jump to s2).
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In case ε ∈ L(A), i.e., Q0 ∩ F 6= ∅, then also all sequences in 0Σ1(Σ1)∗ are produced as the L view on a
run in which the first transition, with H action h, is to s2.
Note that since L is always scheduled after the first step, replacing any action by H after the first step
in a run by any other action of H results in another run, with no change to the L view. Thus, the only
thing that needs to be checked to determine whether M(A) ∈ NDI is whether the same can be said for the
first step. Moreover, it can be seen from the above that, for all A, and independently of whether ε ∈ L(A),
any L view obtained from a run in which the first H action is h can also be obtained from a run in which
the first H action is h′. Thus, to show M(A) ∈ NDI, it suffices to check that any L view obtained from a
run in which the first H action is h′ can also be obtained from a run in which the first action is h.
Proposition 2 L(A) = Σ∗ iff M(A) ∈ NDI.
Proof For the ‘only if’ part, suppose L(A) = Σ∗. We show that M(A) ∈ NDI. As argued above, it suffices
to show that any view obtained from a run in which the first H action is h′ can also be obtained from a
run in which the first action is h. Let r = s0(h
′, b1)t1 . . . (an, bn)tn be a run of M(A), with the ai ∈ AH
and the bi ∈ AL. If t1 = s2 then since ε ∈ L(A), simply by replacing the first transition by s0 (h,b1)−−−−→ s2 we
obtain a run with first H action h that has exactly the same L view. Otherwise t1 = s1. If all obsL(ti) = 0
then we may construct a run of M(A) with the same L view as r by taking any transition into Q in the first
step, then remaining within Q throughout, or making a transition to s3 if there is no enabled transition
of A on the given input bi. Otherwise, let i be the least index with obsL(ti) = 1. Since L(A) = Σ∗, there
exists a run q0
b2−→ q1 . . . bi−→ qi−1 of A with qi−1 ∈ F . By construction of M(A), it then follows that
r′ = s0
(h,b1)−−−−→ q0 (h,b1)−−−−→ q1 . . . qi−2 (ai,bi)−−−−→ s2 . . . (an,bn)−−−−−→ s2
is a run with the same L view as r but with first H action h. Thus, M(A) ∈ NDI.
For the ‘if’ part, suppose there is a word w = a1a2 . . . an 6∈ L(A). If w = ε, then the transition s0 h−→ s2
is not present in M(A), so there is no run starting with H action h that produces the L view 0b1 (with
b ∈ Σ) that we get from s0 (h
′,b)−−−−→ s1. Otherwise, for an arbitrary a0 ∈ Σ, the L view 0a00a10a2 . . . an1
cannot be obtained from runs in which the first H action is h, because otherwise w would be accepted by
A. However this view is obtained from a run in which the first action is h′. Therefore M(A) 6∈ NDI. uunionsq
As pointed out at the beginning of this section, this lower bound result already holds for scheduled
machines, and thus NDI is already PSPACE-hard for this subclass.
4 Nondeducibility on Strategies
In this section we establish the following theorem:
Theorem 4 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, and with respect to log-space reductions,
NDS is EXPSPACE-complete.
4.1 EXPSPACE-Easiness
For the proof that NDS is decidable in EXPSPACE, we show that the problem is in DSPACE(2O(|M|)). It
is convenient for this section to consider strategies pi that are defined over the larger set VH = O(AHO)∗
of candidate views of H, rather than the subset viewH(R(M)) of possible views.
We use the characterization of NDS given in Proposition 1. Let pi be an H strategy, and β be an L view.
Say that pi excludes β if there does not exist a run r consistent with pi such that β = viewL(r). Since always
R(M,pi) ⊆ R(M), by Proposition 1, a system M satisfies NDS if and only if it is not the case that there
exists a possible L view β in M and a strategy pi such that pi excludes β.
Our decidability result and complexity bound is obtained by showing that if such a strategy exists, then
there is one of a particular normal form, and it can be found using a space-bounded search. The normal
form strategies have a uniform structure, in that the choice of next action on an H view depends only on
the length of the view and the set of states that H considers possible after that view, given that L’s view
β has not yet been excluded. We call this set of states H’s knowledge set.
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More precisely, the knowledge sets are defined as follows. Given a candidate H view α ∈ O(AHO)∗ and
a (to be excluded) candidate L view β ∈ O(ALO)∗ with |α| ≤ |β|, define K(α, pi, β) to be the set of all final
states of runs r consistent with pi such that viewH(r) = α and viewL(r) is a prefix of β.
These knowledge sets can be obtained in an incremental way using the update operators δaH ,oH ,aL,oL :
P(S)→ P(S) defined for each aH ∈ AH , aL ∈ AL, and oH , oL ∈ O, to map T ∈ P(S) to
δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(T ) = {s ∈ S | ∃t ∈ T with t
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ s and obsH(s) = oH and obsL(s) = oL}.
The incremental characterisation is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that pi(α) = aH and |α| = |β|. Then δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(K(α, pi, β)) = K(αaHoH , pi, βaLoL).
Proof We first show that
δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(K(α, pi, β)) ⊆ K(αaHoH , pi, βaLoL).
Suppose t ∈ δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(K(α, pi, β)). We show that t ∈ K(αaHoH , pi, βaLoL). We have that there exists
s ∈ K(α, pi, β) such that s (aH ,aL)−−−−−→ t and obsH(t) = oH and obsL(t) = oL. Thus there exists a run r,
consistent with pi, and with final state s, such that viewH(r) = α and viewL(r) = β. Since pi(α) = aH , we
obtain that the run r (aH , aL) t is consistent with pi and justifies t ∈ K(αaHoH , pi, βaLoL).
Conversely, suppose t ∈ K(αaHoH , pi, βaLoL). Then there exists a run r′ consistent with pi, which
can be written in the form r (aH , aL) t with viewH(r) = α, and obsH(t) = oH , and viewL(r) = β and
obsL(t) = oL. Let s be the final state of r. Then we have s ∈ K(α, pi, β). It is now immediate that
t ∈ δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(K(α, pi, β)). uunionsq
The following result shows that it suffices to consider strategies in which the choice of action depends
only on the time and H’s knowledge set, given the L view being excluded.
Lemma 3 If there exists an H strategy pi that excludes β, then there exists an H strategy pi′ that also
excludes β, and has the property that for all H views α and α′, if K(α, pi′, β) = K(α′, pi′, β) and |α| = |α′|
then pi′(α) = pi′(α′).
Proof Suppose that pi excludes β. For purposes of the proof, note that we can assume without loss of
generality that β is infinite — this helps to avoid mention of views longer than β as a separate case. (Note
that it is equivalent to say that pi excludes some prefix of β.)
Let f be any mapping from VH to VH such that for all α, α′ ∈ VH we have
1. |f(α)| = |α|,
2. K(α, pi, β) = K(f(α), pi, β),
3. if |α| = |α′| and K(α, pi, β) = K(α′, pi, β), then f(α) = f(α′).
Such a mapping always exists; intuitively, it merely picks, at each length, a representative f(α) ∈ [α]∼ of the
equivalence classes of the equivalence relation defined by α ∼ α′ if |α| = |α′| and K(α, pi, β) = K(α′, pi, β).
Now define the mapping g on VH as follows. Let α0 = obsH(s0) be the only possible H view of length
0. For α ∈ VH of length 0, we define g(α) = α. For longer α, we define g(αao) = f(g(α))pi(f(g(α))o. Also,
define the strategy pi′ by pi′(α) = pi(f(g(α))).
We claim that for all α ∈ VH we have K(α, pi′, β) = K(g(α), pi, β). The proof is by induction on the
length of α. The base case is straightforward, since α0 is consistent with all strategies, so K(α0, pi
′, β) =
{s0} = K(α0, pi, β), and K(α, pi′, β) = ∅ = K(α, pi, β) for α 6= α0 with |α| = 0. Suppose the claim holds for
α ∈ VH of length i. Let αao ∈ VH . By induction and (2), K(α, pi′, β) = K(g(α), pi, β) = K(f(g(α)), pi, β).
Let β′aLoL be the prefix of β of length |α| + 1. Since action a = pi′(α) = pi(f(g(α)), using Lemma 2, we
have that
K(αao, pi′, β) = K(αao, pi′, β′aLoL)
= δa,o,aL,oL(K(α, pi
′, β′))
= δa,o,aL,oL(K(f(g(α)), pi, β
′))
= K(f(g(α))ao, pi, β′aLoL)
= K(f(g(α))ao, pi, β)
= K(g(αao), pi, β) .
To see that pi′ has the required property, if K(α, pi′, β) = K(α′, pi′, β) with |α| = |α′|, then we have
K(g(α), pi, β) = K(g(α′), pi, β). By (3) we have f(g(α)) = f(g(α′)). Therefore pi′(α) = pi(f(g(α))) =
pi(f(g(α′))) = pi′(α′), by definition.
Since pi excludes β, there exists a length n such that for all α ∈ VH with |α| = n, we have K(α, pi, β) = ∅.
Thus, we also have for all α of length n that K(α, pi′, β) = K(g(α), pi, β) = ∅. This means that pi′ also
excludes β. uunionsq
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Based on Lemma 3, we construct a transition system T (M) = (Q, q0 ⇒) that simultaneously searches
for the strategy pi and an L view β that is excluded by pi. The components are defined by:
1. Q = P(S)× P(P(S)),
2. q0 = ({s0}, {{s0}}),
3. the transition relation ⇒ is defined by (U,K)⇒(ρ,aL,oL) (U ′,K′) if
(a) ρ : K → AH , and aL ∈ AL and oL ∈ O,
(b) U ′ = {t | there exists s ∈ U , and a transition s (a
′
H ,aL)−−−−−→ t, with a′H ∈ AH and oL = obsL(t) } 6= ∅,
and
(c) K′ = {δaH ,oH ,aL,oL(k) | k ∈ K and aH = ρ(k) and oH ∈ O}.
Intuitively, the component U in a state (U,K) is used to ensure that the view β that we construct is in
fact possible in M . The component K represents a collection of all possible knowledge sets that H can be
in at a certain point of time, while attempting to exclude β. More specifically, each set k in K corresponds
to α ∈ VH such that k = K(α, pi, β). In a transition, we both determine the next phase of pi, by extending
pi so that pi(α) = ρ(K(α, pi, β)), and extend β to βaLoL. Moreover, an H strategy generated by T (M) is
only sensitive to H’s knowledge set and lengths of runs, i.e., it satisfies that K(α, pi′, β) = K(α′, pi′, β) and
|α| = |α′| implies pi′(α) = pi′(α′). In the above construct, ρ represents the local choice of H that depends
only on the knowledge set of H.
The following result justifies the correspondence between the transition system T (M) and NDS.
Lemma 4 A machine M does not satisfy NDS iff T (M) contains a path q0 ⇒∗ (U,K) to a state where
K = ∅.
Proof We first prove the implication from left to right. Suppose first that M does not satisfy NDS, witnessed
by the fact that pi excludes the possible L view β = o0b1o1b2, . . . bnon. We may assume without loss of
generality that no strict prefix of β is excluded. By Lemma 3, we may assume that pi has the property that
it takes the same value on H views α, α′ that have the same length and have K(α, pi, β) = K(α′, pi, β). We
construct a path
q0 = (U0,K0)⇒(ρ1,b1,o1) (U1,K1)⇒(ρ2,b2,o2) . . .⇒(ρn,bn,on) (Un,Kn)
in the transition system T (M), by defining the functions ρi : Ki−1 → AH for i ≥ 1, and then deriving Ui
from Ui−1 using the equation in clause 3(b) of the definition of T (M), and deriving Ki from Ki−1 and ρi
using the equation in clause 3(c). (This guarantees that each step satisfies all the conditions of the definition
of ⇒, except the requirement in 3(b) that U ′ 6= ∅; we check this below.) The construction will have the
property that every k ∈ Ki−1 is equal to some K(α, pi, β) with α ∈ VH of length i− 1. This means that we
may define ρi(k) = pi(α). Note that ρi is well-defined, by the assumption on pi. More precisely, we claim
that for each i = 0 . . . n, Ki is a subset of the set {K(α, pi, o0b1o1 . . . bioi) | |α| = i}. Note that this means
that if k ∈ Kn then k = ∅, for else we have an H view α of length |β| such that K(α, pi, β) 6= ∅, which
implies that pi does not exclude β. Thus Kn = ∅, as required for the right hand side of the result.
The proof of the claim is by induction on i. The base case of n = 0 is immediate from that fact that β is a
possible view, soK(obsH(s0), pi, o0) = {s0}. Suppose k′ ∈ Ki+1. We show k′ = K(α′, pi, o0b1o1 . . . bioibi+1oi+1)
for some α′ of length i + 1. By definition of Ki+1, there exists k ∈ Ki, and oH ∈ O, such that with
aH = ρ(k), we have k
′ = δbi+1,oi+1,aH ,oH (k). By induction, there exists α ∈ VH of length i such that
k = K(α, pi, o0b1o1 . . . bioi). By Lemma 2, it follows that k
′ = K(αaHoH , pi, o0b1o1 . . . bioibi+1oi+1), as
required.
It remains to show that Ui 6= ∅ for each i = 1 . . . n. For this, note that since β is a possible L view, there
exists a run s0
(a1,b1)−−−−→ s1 (a2,b2)−−−−→ . . . (an,bn)−−−−−→ sn such that obsL(si) = oi for i = 1 . . . n. A straightforward
induction shows that for each i, we have si ∈ Ui, so in fact Ui 6= ∅, as required.
For the other direction, suppose that
q0 = (U0,K0)⇒(ρ1,b1,o1) (U1,K1)⇒(ρ2,b2,o2) . . .⇒(ρn,bn,on) (Un,Kn)
and Kn = {∅}. We construct a strategy pi that excludes β = obsL(s0)b1o1 . . . bnon. A straightforward
induction using clause 3(b) of the definition of T (M) shows that β is a possible L view in M . The con-
struction of pi is done inductively, by defining a sequence of strategies pi0, pi1, . . . , pin such that if i ≤ j
then pii and pij agree on all H views of length at most i − 1. At each stage of the construction, we claim
that for all H views α of length i ≥ 0, if K(α, pii, β) 6= ∅ then K(α, pii, β) ∈ Ki. Inductively, we let pi0 be
any strategy and define pii+1(α) = ρi+1(K(α, pii, β)) if |α| = i and K(α, pii, β) 6= ∅, and pii+1(α) = pii(α)
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otherwise. Evidently, pii+1 is well defined by the claim that K(α, pii, β) 6= ∅ then K(α, pii, β) ∈ Ki. Also
this definition plainly satisfies the condition that if i ≤ j then pii and pij agree on all views of length at
most i− 1. Note also that since Kn = {∅}, by the claim there does not exist an H view α of length n such
that K(α, pin, β) 6= ∅. It follows that pin excludes β.
It therefore suffices to show that the definition satisfies the claim. Note that it holds trivially for any
strategy if i = 0. Suppose that for all H views α of length i, if K(α, pii, β) 6= ∅ then K(α, pii, β) ∈ Ki. Let
αaHoH be an H view of length i + 1 ≤ n− 1 with K(αaHoH , pii+1, β) 6= ∅. Then also K(α, pii+1, β) 6= ∅
and pii+1(α) = aH . Since pii and pii+1 agree on views of length at most i− 1, we also have K(α, pii+1, β) =
K(α, pii, β) 6= ∅, so K(α, pii+1, β) ∈ Ki. By Lemma 2, we have that K(αaHoH , pii+1, β) = δbi+1,oi+1,aH ,oH
(K(α, pii+1, β)) ∈ Ki+1, as required. uunionsq
We obtain the claimed complexity bound from Lemma 4, simply by noting that it reduces NDS to a
reachability problem in the transition system T (M). Since the states of the system T (M) can be repre-
sented in space O(|S| · 2|S|) = 2O(|S|), we obtain from Savitch’s theorem that we can do the search in
DSPACE(2O(|S|)).
4.2 EXPSPACE-Hardness
To show that NDS is EXPSPACE-hard, we show how to encode the game BLIND-PEEK of Reif [Rei84].
We need only scheduled machines for the encoding, so the problem is EXPSPACE-hard already for this
subclass.
4.2.1 The Game BLIND-PEEK
BLIND-PEEK is a variant of the two-player game PEEK introduced by Stockmeyer and Chandra [SC79].
A PEEK game consists of a box with two open sides that contains horizontally stacked plates; the players
sit at opposite sides of the box. Each plate has two positions, ‘in’ and ‘out’, and contains a knob at one
side of the box, so that this plate can be controlled by one of the players. At each step, one of the two
players may grasp a knob from his side and push it ‘in’ or ‘out’. The player may also pass. Both the top
of the box and the plates have holes in various positions, and each hole is associated to a player. If, just
after a move of player a ∈ {1, 2}, the plates are positioned so that for one of the player’s holes in the top
of the box, it is possible to peek through from the top of the box to the bottom (i.e., each plate has a hole
positioned directly underneath the top hole), then player a wins. In PEEK, both players can observe the
position of all plates at all times. BLIND-PEEK [Rei84] (more formally, the game G2B of that paper) is a
modification of PEEK in which player 1’s side of the box is partially covered, so that it is not possible for
player 1 to see the positions of the plates controlled by player 2. We may represent the game formally as
follows:
Definition 7 An instance G of the BLIND-PEEK game is given by a tuple (n, n1, Φ1, Φ2, ν0) where n and
n1 are natural numbers with n1 < n,
Φ1 =
h1∨
j=1
γ1j and Φ2 =
h2∨
j=1
γ2j
are disjunctive normal form formulas over the set of atomic propositions {P1, . . . , Pn}, and ν0 : [1..n] →
{0, 1} represents a boolean assignment to these propositions. The size of the instance is O(n(h1 + h2)).
Here hi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, is the number of holes on the top of the box for each player. Intuitively, n gives
the number of plates, and the propositions Pk for 1 ≤ k ≤ n correspond to the positions of the plates,
which can be either in (Pk false) or out (Pk true), and a state of the game G is given by a mapping
ν : [1..n] → {0, 1}, with Pk true at ν just when ν(k) = 1. The total number of states in a game is thus
exponential in the size of the game. The assignment ν0 specifies the initial state of the game. The number
n1 specifies the number of plates associated to player 1; we take these to be plates 1..n1. The formula Φi
gives the winning condition for player i. Each disjunct γij corresponds to one of the holes on the top of
the box that is associated to player i. Which literals are in γij depends on how the hole in the top of the
box aligns with a hole on the plates when these are in or out. If there is always an alignment with a hole
on plate k then γij contains neither Pk nor ¬Pk. If there is an alignment only when the k-th plate is out
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then γij contains the literal Pk, and conversely, if there is an alignment only when the k-th plate is in then
γij contains the literal ¬Pk. (If there is never an alignment then we may include both Pk and ¬Pk, but,
obviously, we may just as well remove the hole from the game.)
Players 1 and 2 play in turn by moving one of their plates or passing. As the players’ plate numbers
partition the set [1 . . . n], we can denote the moves of the players movei with 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if i ∈ [1..n1] it is
a move of player 1, and a move of player 2 otherwise. We let Move1 = {movei | 1 ≤ i ≤ n1} ∪ {Pass} and
Move2 = {movei | n1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {Pass}.
A play % in G is an alternating sequence of player 1 and player 2 moves of the form
% = ν0
λ1−−−→ ν1 λ2−−−→ ν2 · · · νi−1 λi−−−→ νi
where λj is a player 1 move in Move1 when j is odd and a player 2 move in Move2 when j is even. Moreover,
if λl = Pass then νl = νl−1 and if λl = movek, then νl(k) = 1− νl−1(k) and νl(j) = νl−1(j) for j 6= k.
A state ν is winning for player p if it satisfies the formula Φp. A play % is winning for player p if it
contains a state νk immediately after a move by player p that is winning for that player, and there is no
earlier such winning state for the other player. Otherwise the play is undecided.
We are interested in the problem of deciding whether there is a winning strategy for player 1, i.e., a
way for the player to choose their moves that guarantees, whatever the other player does, that player 1
will win. Strategies usually choose a next move based on what the player has been able to observe over a
play of the game. In the case of the game G, the information directly visible to player 1 in a state is just
the position of plates 1..n1. Player 2 sees the position of all plates. A player also remembers the sequence
of moves they have played at their turn. At each step of the play, the player is also advised whether any
player has won the game. (In a physical realization of the game, if a player were to peek through a hole
they would be able to see which is the topmost plate that blocks it. We assume that the player does not
get this information in the formal game. One can imagine a physical realization in which a referee peeks
through the holes and announces the result.)
Since the winning condition is a discrete, state-based condition, deterministic strategies suffice. More-
over, note that, except for the information about who has won the game, the effect of the players’ moves on
the information directly visible to player 1 is deterministic: we can deduce the position of player 1’s plates
from the moves that player 1 has made so far in the game. Thus, every undecided play in which player 1
has made a particular sequence of moves yields the same view for player 1, and on a deterministic strategy,
player 1 must make the same next move on all such plays. This means that we may represent a player 1
strategy simply by a (finite or infinite) sequence of moves Λ = λ1, λ3, λ5 . . .. Such a strategy is winning for
player 1 if every play with this sequence of moves by player 1 is winning for player 1.
The following result characterizes the complexity of BLIND-PEEK.
Theorem 5 [Rei84] The game BLIND-PEEK is complete for EXPSPACE under log-space reductions.
We use this result to show that NDS is EXPSPACE-hard. Given an instance G of BLIND-PEEK, we
construct a synchronous system M(G) of size polynomial in the size of G, with the following property:
player 1 has a winning strategy in G iff there exists an L view vL and an H strategy pi that excludes vL in
M(G).
Intuitively, the winning strategy Λ of player 1 in the game G will be encoded within the sequence of
L actions contained in the view vL. The role of the H strategy pi in the machine M(G) is to help in the
verification that the strategy Λ is winning, by ensuring that the view vL cannot occur when this is the
case. As we cannot encode the exponential number of possible states of the BLIND-PEEK game G directly
in the polynomial number of states of M(G), we use an encoding trick, which is to represent the state of
the game as the set of states of M(G) that are consistent with the H view. Roughly, each such consistent
state corresponds to one of the plates; there are some additional states for initialization and book-keeping
related to the winning condition.
4.2.2 High level structure of M(G).
We let n2 = n− n1 be the number of plates that can be moved by player 2.
The machine M(G) will be a scheduled machine (see Section 2.4), with deterministic schedule following
the regular expression ⊥(LHL⊥Hh2)ω. Here occurrences of H and L indicate which agent’s action the
transition is allowed to depend upon, and ⊥ is for a system step that is independent of both agents H
and L. We call each instance of the infinitely repeated block LHL⊥Hh2 a round, and use indices, as in
L1H0L2⊥H1..Hh2 to refer to the stages of the round.
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The alphabet of actions for L and H are AL and AH defined by:
A−L = {movei | i ∈ [1 . . . n1]}
AL = A
−
L ∪ {checkwin}
AH = {isOpenk | k ∈ [1..h1]} ∪ {isBlockingk | k ∈ [1 . . . n]}.
Informally, the behaviour of M(G) in each step is as follows:
1. In the first ⊥ step of the schedule, the machine nondeterministically makes a transition to one of n
subsystems, each of which monitors one particular plate of the game. Neither H nor L is able to see
which subsystem they are actually in during subsequent transitions. The machine then moves into the
cyclically repeated rounds.
2. The L1 stage of each round allows L to perform one move of player 1 in the game G (using an action
movei) or to pass (using the action checkwin). This stage corresponds to a move according to a blindfold
strategy of player 1.
3. In the following H0 stage, agent H is given an opportunity to assert that the last L move has achieved
a win of player 1, by specifying a hole j of player 1 and claiming that it is possible to peek through
(using an action isOpenj). H may also pass (using any other action).
4. The following L2 stage allows L to check, by performing a “checkwin” action, if a winning state has
been reached, as claimed by H sometime before. If it is so, then some of the L views will be ruled out.
If it is still not a win, or H has not yet asserted a win, or H has made a mistake, this “checkwin”
action will not rule out any L view. (Once a “checkwin” fails in this way, no L views will be excluded
thereafter.)
5. The next stage ⊥ simulates a move of player 2 in the game G.
6. During the last h2 stages, agent H is given an opportunity to assert that the last player 2 move is not
a win, and explain this claim by pointing, for each of the h2 peek-holes of player 2, to a plate j that
blocks that hole, using an action isBlockingj .
The observations of the agents L,H in M(G) are defined so that neither agent ever learns which plate is
being simulated on the current run. Agent L observes the player 1 moves and a result of any “checkwin”
actions. Agent H observes all moves by either player.
Intuitively, suppose player 1 has a winning strategy and agent L faithfully follows this strategy in the L1
stage of each round. Suppose also that agent H, who knows every previous move of the play, always makes
correct assertions about whether holes are open or blocked. Then L is guaranteed to be able to eventually
make a successful “checkwin” and get some L views ruled out. To handle the case where H makes incorrect
assertions, the construction ensures that no L view is eliminated if this happens. Thus, the statement that
there is some H strategy that eliminates an L view corresponds to the statement that H has a way of
making correct assertions in order to show that the player 1 strategy is winning.
4.2.3 States and observations of M(G).
Formally, the state space of M(G) is defined as
{s0} ∪ (C× P× B×M) ∪ (C× F),
where s0 is the initial state, and the components are as follows:
– C = {L1, H0, L2,⊥, H1, · · · , Hh2} encodes a clock that represents the current stage in a round of the
cyclic part of the schedule,
– P = {1, . . . n} represents the plate being monitored,
– B = {0, 1} encodes whether the current plate is “in” or “out”,
– M = Move1 ∪ Move2 ∪{⊥} records the most recent move in the play (and ⊥ for simulation steps that do
not correspond to game steps), and
– F = {(win,⊥), (error ,⊥), (win, 1), (error , 1), (error , 2)} records the result of claims made by H.
The observation mappings for H and L on these states are given by:
– obsL((c, r, 1)) = 1 and obsL((c, r, 2)) = 2, where c ∈ C and r ∈ {win, error}, and obsL(s) = ⊥ for all s
not of this form.
– obs(s0) = ⊥, and obsH((c, i, k, a)) = a and obsH(s) = end for all s ∈ C× F.
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Fig. 3 High level structure of M(G)
States of M(G) of type (c, i, k, a) ∈ C × P × B ×M encode information about the effect of the play of
the game so far on a particular plate: c ∈ C indicates the current stage of the simulation, i ∈ [1..n] is a
monitored plate, k ∈ B is the position of the plate i and a ∈ M is the most recent move made in the game,
or ⊥ if none.
States of M(G) in C× F are used to capture the effect of assertions made by H relating to the winning
conditions, and play a key role in ensuring that an L view is eliminated under the appropriate conditions.
These states form a “terminal” part of the machine: it is not possible to return to the component C×P×B×M
from these states. The C component simply tracks the simulation stages. Figure 3 sketches the way that
the F components of these states are used to check winning conditions for the game and to generate
observations.
Intuitively, at various stages of the simulation (viz., H0 and H1 . . . Hh2), agent H is allowed to make
assertions about the state of the game. When H makes such an assertions, M(G) checks whether they are
true at the plate being simulated.
– If the assertion entails that there is not yet a win for player 2, and is true of the present plate, or does
not concern the present plate, then we continue the simulation. (Specifically, this case occurs when the
assertion is that a particular plate is blocking the hole for player 2 under consideration, and this is true
or concerns another plate.)
– If the assertion entails a win for player 1 and is true of the present plate, then a transition is made to
a state (win,⊥). (Specifically, the assertion is that a particular player 1 hole is open, and this holds at
the present plate.)
– The remaining possibility is that the assertion is false. In this case we make a transition to a state
(error ,⊥). (We have this case when either the assertion is that a particular player 1 hole is open, but
this is false at the present plate, or is that the present plate is blocking a particular player 2 hole, but
this is false.)
When L eventually performs a checkwin action in the appropriate phase L2, states with (error ,⊥) could
produce either the observation 1 or 2. By contrast, states with (win,⊥) produce only the observation 1.
Thus, the win states result in a reduced set of views. Note that we can only check assertions locally at
the current plate, and the winning condition for player 1 requires that a player 1 hole be unblocked at all
plates. The way that the encoding handles this is via L’s uncertainty about which plate is being monitored:
if there is any plate at which the hole is blocked, then there will be a run consistent with L’s observations,
monitoring this plate, at which we have (error ,⊥). When L performs checkwin in this run it will obtain
both observations 1 and 2, and the set of views is not reduced.
4.2.4 Transitions of M(G)
In general, transitions in a machine are labelled by joint actions (aH , aL) of H and L, but since M(G) is a
scheduled machine, at most one of these has any effect on the state. To simplify the presentation, we use the
convention of writing s
b−→ t with b ∈ Au, to indicate that the current transition is dependent only on u, and
write s
τ−→ t if the transition is independent of both H and L (i.e., a system step). To capture the scheduler,
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we define the function next : C→ C so that it maps each element of the sequence L1, H0, L1,⊥, H1 . . . Hh2
to the element next in the sequence, with next(Hh2) = L1.
To describe the transitions we use the following predicates relating to the winning conditions. When
i ∈ {1, 2} is a player, j = 1..hi is a hole associated to that player, k ∈ P is a plate and b ∈ B is a plate
position, we define Openij(k, b), to be true just when either proposition Pk does not occur positively or
negatively in γij , or Pk occurs positively in γ
i
j and b = 1 or ¬Pk occurs in γij and b = 0. Intuitively, this
says that when plate k is in position b, it is not blocking hole j.
We group the transitions according to the step of the schedule. We first describe transitions from states
in {s0} ∪ (C× P× B×M).
Initial Step ⊥ The initial state of M(G) is s0. From this state, we non-deterministically choose one plate
to be monitored. This transition does not depend on any agents and has the form
s0
τ−−→ (L1, i, ν0(i),⊥)
for i ∈ [1 . . . n], where ν0 is the initial state of G.
Stage L1 At this stage, we simulate player 1’s move of a plate j. The special action checkwin is used for
the pass move. For each movej ∈ AL, and state (L1, i, k, a) there is a transition of the form:
(L1, i, k, a)
movej−−−−−→ (H0, i, k′, movej)
with k′ = 1− k if j = i and k′ = k otherwise. We also add
(L1, i, k, a)
checkwin−−−−−−−−→ (H0, i, k, Pass)
for the pass move.
Stage H0 At this stage H may try to prove that player 1 can peek through some hole j ∈ [1..h1]. To do
this, it chooses an action isOpenj . As it is a guess, H might be wrong. If H claims that player 1 can peek
through hole j and this is right at the present plate, we reach a “winning” state in C × F, otherwise an
error state. From a plate simulation state (H0, i, k, a) there is a transition
(H0, i, k, a)
isOpen
j−−−−−−−→ (L2, r,⊥)
where r = win if Open1j (i, k), and r = error otherwise. H may also intentionally choose not to declare a
win, by performing any of its actions isBlockingj for j ∈ {1 . . . n}. This is captured by the transitions
(H0, i, k, a)
isBlocking
j−−−−−−−−−−−→ (L2, i, k,⊥)
for j ∈ {1 . . . n}.
Stage L2 At this stage, L can perform the action “checkwin” to check if H has proved a win by player 1.
If the current state at this stage is a plate simulation state, then H has not yet claimed a win for player
1, and any past assertions made by H about player 2’s winning condition were either true or irrelevant to
the current plate. In this case, we do not have evidence for a player 1 win, so we do not wish to eliminate
an L view. Thus, from states s = (L2, i, k, a), we have transitions
s
checkwin−−−−−−−−→ (⊥, error , 1) and s checkwin−−−−−−−−→ (⊥, error , 2)
so that both observations 1 and 2 can be obtained. Agent L is also allowed to continue playing without
checking for a win, by performing any of the actions movej with j ∈ [1 . . . n1]. For this case we have a
transition
(L2, i, k, a)
movej−−−−−→ (⊥, i, k,⊥) .
(We discuss the case of transitions at this stage from states in C× F below.)
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Stage ⊥ At this stage, we simulate a move of a plate by player 2. The following transitions are in M(G):
(⊥, i, k, a) τ−−→ (H1, i, k′, movej)
for each i ∈ P, k ∈ B and j ∈ [(n1+1) . . . n] (player 2’s plates), and: k′ = 1−k if i = j and k′ = k otherwise.
To model a pass move by player 2 we also have a transition
(⊥, i, k, a) τ−−→ (H1, i, k, Pass) .
Stages H1 to Hh2 In these stages, H tries to prove that that last move by player 2 was not a winning
move for player 2. It does so by showing that all player 2 holes are blocked (by at least one plate). For each
player 2 peek hole j, at stage Hj , agent H chooses a plate i ∈ [1 . . . n] and asserts that the hole is blocked
by that plate using the action isBlockingi. An incorrect assertion results in a transition to an error state
(c, error ,⊥). In particular, if the current state is indeed a win of player 2, then some hole j is open at all
plates, and any attempt H makes to assert that it closed at a plate causes a transition to an error state.
This is encoded by the following transitions. At state (Hj , i
′, k, a) with j ∈ [1..h2], we have
(Hj , i
′, k, a)
isBlocking
i−−−−−−−−−−−→ (next(Hj), i′, k,⊥) .
when either i 6= i′ (plate i is not monitored in the current state), or i = i′ and not Open2j (i, k) (the present
plate is blocking player 2’s hole j). On the other hand, if i = i′ and Open2j (i, k), i.e., player 2’s peek hole j
is not blocked by plate i, we have the transition
(Hj , i
′, k, a)
isBlocking
i−−−−−−−−−−−→ (next(Hj), error ,⊥) .
As pointed out before, the construction is designed to ensure that H knows the exact state of the game
and thus can always determine whether a peek hole is blocked or not. Since we are looking for a winning
strategy for player 1, if there is a win by player 2 then the present L strategy has failed. We would therefore
like to insist that H must play only isBlockingi actions at this stage of the process. To ensure this, we
define transitions so that all H actions other than isBlockingi cause an error transition at these stages.
That is, for all H actions isOpenj and states of the form (c, i, k, a) with c ∈ {H1, . . . , Hh2}, we have a
transition
(c, i, k, a)
isOpen
j−−−−−−→ (next(c), error ,⊥) .
This completes the description of transitions from states in C× P× B×M.
Transitions from C×F The behaviour of the machine on states in C×F was described informally above.
The main effect of actions is from checkwin actions performed at stage L2. From states with observation
⊥, the action checkwin causes an L observation of 1 or 2. For the win states we have a transition
(L2,win,⊥) checkwin−−−−−−−→ (⊥,win, 1)
and for the error states we have transitions
(L2, error ,⊥) checkwin−−−−−−−→ (⊥, error , 1) and (L2, error ,⊥) checkwin−−−−−−−→ (⊥, error , 2) .
For all other cases, i.e., for c = L2 and an action b = movej , or for c ∈ C\{L2} and an action b (appropriate
to stage c), we have for all r ∈ {win, error} a transition
(c, r,⊥) b−→ (next(c), r,⊥) .
States at which an observation of 1 or 2 has already been obtained by L act as sinks, except for scheduler
moves, i.e., we have a transition
(c, r, x)
b−→ (next(c), r, x)
for all c ∈ C, r ∈ {win, error} and x ∈ {1, 2}.
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4.2.5 Correctness of the construction
We now give the argument for the correctness of the encoding.
We first characterize the views obtained by the agents in M(G). In the case of agent L, the structure
of the possible views follows straightforwardly from the fact that the transitions as defined above follow
the structure indicated in Figure 3. Until a checkwin action is performed by L at some stage L2 state, L
observes ⊥. Once it performs that action at this stage, it will observe either 1 or 2 for the remainder of
time. Thus, L views are prefixes of the sequences generated by the regular expressions
⊥AL⊥ (AL⊥AL⊥A−L⊥AL⊥(AL⊥)h2)∗AL⊥AL⊥ checkwinx (AL x)∗
with x = 1 or x = 2. Here the expression AL⊥AL⊥A−L⊥AL⊥(AL⊥)h2 corresponds to a round in which
L does not perform checkwin at stage L2. If α is an L view, we write Λ(α) for the subsequence of player 1
actions performed at times when the simulation is at stage L1, where we treat a checkwin at such a time
as the action Pass.
The H views are prefixes of the sequences in the regular expression
⊥(AH (Move1 ∪ Move2 ∪ {⊥}))∗(AH end)∗
where the observations obtained at stage H0 are in Move1 ∪{⊥}, the observations obtained at stage H1 are
in Move2 ∪ {⊥}, and all other observations before the first end are ⊥.
We will show that there is a correspondence between plays of the game G and views β of H. In particular,
given an H view β, let σ(β) = λ1 . . . λn be the subsequence of elements of Move1 ∪ Move2 appearing in
observations. It follows from the definition of the transition relation that σ(β) is an alternating sequence
of player 1 and player 2 actions. Since the moves of G have a deterministic effect on the states of G, we
obtain a play
%(β) = ν0
λ1−−→ ν1 λ2−−→ ν2 . . . λn−−→ νn
of the game G. We define ν(β) to be the final state νn of %(β).
Consider an action a of H performed at an H view β at stage c. This will be recorded in the view of H,
which will have the form β a o immediately after this action. We say that the action a is truthful at view β,
if
– β = ⊥ is the view obtained at the run s0, or
– β contains an action isOpenj (intuitively, H has already discharged the obligation to prove that L wins),
or
– the stage c is in {L0, L1,⊥} (H makes no assertion at these stages), or
– c = H0 and a = isOpenj and hole j of player 1 is open in state ν(β), i.e., ν(β) satisfies γ
1
j , or
– c = H0 and a = isBlockingj for some j (this corresponds to no assertion by H), or
– c = Hk for k ∈ [1 . . . h2] and a = isBlockingi and not Open2k(i, ν(β)(i)), i.e., player 2’s hole k is blocked
at plate i in state ν(β).
Note that we omit the case where c = Hk, k ≥ 1 and a = isOpenj ; intuitively, this corresponds to an
assertion of False by H, which has an obligation to prove that the play is winning for player 1, and is failing
to do so in this instance. We say that the view β is truthful if for every prefix β a o, the action a is truthful
at β.
We now show that, so long as the play %(β) is undecided, the knowledge set of H encodes the state ν(β).
For agent u we write Ku(α) for the set of final states of runs r of M(G) with viewu(r) = α, representing
agent u’s knowledge of the state after obtaining view α. Given a stage c, a state ν of game G and a ∈ M,
we let S(c, ν, a) be the set defined by S(c, ν, a) = {(c, i, ν(i), a) | i ∈ [1..n]}. Note that ν can be recovered
from the set S(c, ν, a).
Proposition 3 Suppose that β is an H view in M(G) of length at least 1 such that β does not contain the
observation end and %(β) is an undecided play of game G. Let c be the stage reached at the end of β and
let the final observation of β be a. Then if β is truthful, we have KH(β) = S(c, ν(β), a).
Proof We proceed by induction on the length of β. If β has length 1, then it arises from a run
s0
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ (L1, i, ν0(i),⊥)
so we have β = ⊥aH⊥, and σ(β) is the empty sequence, corresponding to the play %(β) = ν0. (Since we
are interested in views, we use the explicit form of runs here, with actions of both H and L given, rather
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than the shorthand form used above, which mentioned only actions of the scheduled agents and implies
that action the other agents may take all possible values.) The runs consistent with β are
s0
(aH ,a)−−−−→ (L1, j, ν0(j),⊥)
where j ∈ P and a is some action of L. It is immediate that the claim holds.
Inductively, assume that β aH o is a truthful H view in M(G) such that KH(β) = S(c, ν(β), a) for some
c ∈ C and a ∈ M. We need to show that KH(β aH o) = S(c′, ν(β aH o), a′) for some c′ ∈ C and a′ ∈ M.
Note that
KH(β aH o) = {t | s ∈ KH(β) and a ∈ AL and s (aH ,a)−−−−→ t and obsH(t) = o} .
We consider each of the possible cases of the stage c.
Stage c = L1 Here we have either o = movej or o = Pass, which records the action of L, and the transition
does not depend on aH . Note that σ(β aH o) = σ(β) o in this case. Let ν(β)
o−→ ν′, so that ν(β a o) = ν′.
For each plate i ∈ P, we have (L1, i, ν(i), a) ∈ KH(β), and there is a unique transition
(L1, i, ν(i), a)
(aH ,o)−−−−→ (H0, i, ν′(i), o)
yielding observation o at the next state. It follows that KH(β aH o) = S(H0, ν(β aH o), o).
Stage c = H0 Here we have o = ⊥, and σ(β aH o) = σ(β) and ν(β a o) = ν(β). Since %(β a o) is undecided,
ν(β) is not a winning position for player 1. Because β aH o is truthful, we cannot have that aH is isOpenj for
any j, so we must have that aH = isBlockingj for some j. For each plate i ∈ P, we have (H0, i, ν(β)(i), a) ∈
KH(β), and there is a transition
(H0, i, ν(β)(i), a)
(aH ,a
′)−−−−−→ (L1, i, ν(β)(i),⊥)
yielding observation⊥ at the next state for each action a′ of L. It follows thatKH(β aH o) = S(H0, ν(β aH o), o).
Stage c = L2 Since β does not contain end, here we have o = ⊥, and L cannot have performed the action
checkwin. Also σ(β aH o) = σ(β) and ν(β a o) = ν(β). Thus, from each (L2, i, ν(β)(i), a) ∈ KH(β), we have
a transition
(L2, i, ν(β)(i), a)
(aH ,a
′)−−−−−→ (⊥, i, ν(β)(i),⊥)
from which we obtain that KH(β aH o) = S(⊥, ν(β aH o),⊥).
Stage c = ⊥ Here we have that o = Pass or o = movei for some plate i = n1 + 1 . . . n of player 2. Thus,
σ(β aH o) = σ(β) o and if ν(β)
o−→ ν′ then ν(β a o) = ν′. For each plate i ∈ P, we have (⊥, i, ν(β)(i), a) ∈
KH(β), and there is a unique transition
(⊥, i, ν(β)(i), a) (aH ,o)−−−−→ (H1, i, ν′(i), o)
yielding observation o. It follows that KH(β aH o) = S(H1, ν(β aH o), o).
Stage c = Hi for i = 1 . . . h2 Here we have o = ⊥, and σ(β aH o) = σ(β) and ν(β a o) = ν(β). Since
β aH o is truthful and σ(β aH o) is undecided, the position is not winning for player 2. Thus, we must
have that aH = isBlockingj for some j such that not Open
2
i (j, ν(β)(j)). For each plate i
′ ∈ P, we have
(Hi, i
′, ν(β)(i′), a) ∈ KH(β), and there is a transition
(Hi, i
′, ν(β)(i), a)
(aH ,a)−−−−→ (next(Hi), i′, ν(β)(i′),⊥)
yielding observation ⊥ for every L action a. It follows that KH(β aH o) = S(H1, ν(β aH o), o). uunionsq
In fact, we can show this characterization of KH(β) in one further case, corresponding to the state of
the simulation just after player 1 plays a winning move.
Proposition 4 Suppose that β is an H view in M(G) of length at least 1 such that β does not contain the
observation end and %(β) is a play in which the last move is a move of player 1 by which player 1 wins the
game. Assume that no shorter prefix of β has this property and let the final observation of β be a. Then if
β is truthful, we have KH(β) = S(H0, ν(β), a).
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Proof The minimality constraint on β implies that β = β′aHo where β′ is at stage L1, that %(β′) is not a
winning play for either player, and that o ∈ Move1 is a move of player 1 such that %(β′aHo) = %(β′) o−→ ν(β).
By Proposition 3, we obtain that KH(β
′) = S(L1, ν(β), a) for some a. The argument for the case of c = L1
in the proof of Proposition 4 now yields the conclusion. uunionsq
Proposition 5 Suppose that r is a run of M(G) and s ∈ KH(viewH(r)) is a state in C×P×B×M. Then
there exists a run r′ of M(G) with final state s such that viewH(r′) = viewH(r) and viewL(r′) = viewL(r).
Proof By induction on the length of r. For r = s0, the statement is trivial, since we must haveKH(viewH(r)) =
{s0}. For another base case, suppose r is the initial step of a run. In this case,
r = s0
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ (L1, i, ν0(i),⊥)
and viewH(r) = ⊥ aH ⊥ and viewL(r) = ⊥ aL⊥. If s ∈ KH(viewH(r)), then we must have s = (L1, j, ν0(j),⊥)
for some j. We may take
r′ = s0
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ (L1, j, ν0(j),⊥)
and this has the required properties.
For the induction, let
r = r1
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ t
where the result holds for r1, which is at stage c. Let s ∈ KH(viewH(r)). Since s ∈ C × P × B × M,
the final observation of viewH(r) is not end, and it follows that t ∈ C × P × B ×M also. We have that
s = (next(c), i, k, a) for some i, k, a, and arises in KH(viewH(r)) from some run
r2
(a′H ,a
′
L)−−−−−→ s
with viewH(r2) = viewH(r1) and a
′
H = aH and obsH(s) = obsH(t). Necessarily, the final state of r2 is in
C×P×B×M. Moreover, it is inKH(viewH(r2)) = KH(viewH(r1)). By the induction hypothesis, there exists
a run r3 ending in the same final state as r2, with viewH(r3) = viewH(r1) and viewL(r3) = viewL(r1). We
consider the possibilities for the scheduler step c of r1:
– Case c = L1: Note that at this stage, the final L action in r can be deduced from obsH(s) = obsH(t),
so in fact we have a′L = aL also. Let
r′ = r3
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ s .
This is a run because r3 and r2 have the same final state, and the final transition in r
′ is identical to
the final transition of the run r2. Then viewH(r
′) = viewH(r3) aH obsH(s) = viewH(r1) aH obsH(s) =
viewH(r) and viewL(r
′) = viewL(r3) aL⊥ = viewL(r1) aL⊥ = viewL(r), as required.
– Case c = Hk for k = 0..h2: Transitions at these stages are independent of L, so we can switch the action
of L in any transition label while keeping the states the same. So
r′ = r3
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ s
is a run and satisfies the required properties.
– Case c = L2: Here it follows from t ∈ C×P×B×M that aL 6= checkwin. Hence aL = movej for some j,
and obsH(t) = obsH(s) = ⊥. For the same reasons, a′L = movej′ for some j′. The transitions for movej
and movej′ at this stage are identical. We may therefore take
r′ = r3
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ s
and this is a run and satisfies the required properties.
– Case c = ⊥: Here transitions are independent of both players, so
r′ = r3
(aH ,aL)−−−−−→ s
is a run and satisfies the required properties.
This completes the proof of the inductive case. uunionsq
We can now prove the key result that shows that G has a winning strategy for player 1 iff M(G) satisfies
NDS.
Lemma 5 There exists a winning strategy for player 1 in G iff there is an L view α of M(G) and an H
strategy pi that excludes α in M(G).
Proof
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Only If Part Assume player 1 has a winning strategy in G. As argued before, this strategy can be given by
the list Λ = λ1, λ3 . . . of moves of player 1. The number of moves player 1 needs to win is bounded: indeed,
in every play of the game, a winning position for player 1 is eventually reached, and no winning position
for player 2 is reached before this position. By Koenig’s lemma, there exists a number N such in all plays
of the game compatible with Λ, player 1 has won the game at the latest, just after the N -th move. Thus,
we may assume that Λ = λ1, λ3 . . . λN .
We can prove that there exists an H strategy pi in M(G) that excludes the L view
α = ⊥ a0⊥ a1⊥ (a0⊥)3+h2 a3⊥ (a0⊥)3+h2 . . . aN ⊥ a0⊥ checkwin 2.
where a0 denotes any letter in A
−
L , and each ai for i odd is the L action that corresponds to λi at stage
L1, i.e., ai = λi if λi = movej for some j, and ai = checkwin if λi = Pass. The strategy H is defined as
follows. For H views β such that the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ, we let pi(β) be
any truthful action of H at β. In all other cases, pi(β) is chosen arbitrarily.
We first need to show that pi is well-defined. For this, we need to show that H is able to act truthfully
whenever the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ. Suppose, therefore, that the sequence of
player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ. Then the play %(β) is not winning for player 2, since Λ is a winning
strategy for player 1. There are two possibilities: the play is undecided, or the play is winning for player 1.
If the play %(β) is undecided, then by Proposition 3, we have that KH(β) = S(c, ν(β), a). Since ν(β) is, by
definition, the final state of G reached in the play σ(β), if σ(β) ends in a move of player 1 then ν(β) is not
a winning state for player 1, and if σ(β) ends in a move of player 2 then ν(β) is not a winning state for
player 2. In either case, depending on the stage, it is possible to select an action that is truthful at β.
In the other case, the play %(β) is already winning for player 1. Let β′ be the smallest prefix of β such
that σ(β′) is winning for player 1. Since the last action in σ(β′) is a move of player 1 (we can assume
without loss of generality that the game is undecided at the initial state), must have that β′ is at stage H0,
and ν(β) is a winning state for player 1. In the case that β′ = β, we choose pi(β) to be any action isOpenj
such that ν(β) satisfies γ1j , i.e., player 1’s hole j is open at all plates in ν(β). This is then a truthful action
at β. In all other cases, we choose pi(β) arbitrarily. (Note that, by definition, after H’s first isOpenj , any
choice of H action is truthful.)
We now argue that pi excludes view α. To the contrary, suppose that r is run consistent with pi and
viewL(r) = α. Consider β = viewH(r), and write this as β = β1 aH o. Then the sequence of player 1 moves
in σ(β1) is Λ. Since Λ is a winning strategy for player 1, the play %(β1) is a winning play for player 1.
Consider the shortest prefix β2 of β1 such that σ(β2) is a winning play for player 1. Then β2 is at stage
H1, and there is at least one H action a and observation o
′ such that β2 a o′ is a prefix of β. (In the worst
case, β2 = β1 and a = aH .) By construction of pi, a is an action isOpenj that is truthful at β2. Using
Proposition 4, KH(β2) = S(H1, ν(β2), a
′) for some a′. Because isOpenj is truthful at β2, we obtain that
KH(β2 a o
′) = {(⊥,win,⊥)}.
In particular, the prefix r2 of r with viewH(r2) = β2 a o
′ has final state (⊥,win,⊥). Since L does not
perform checkwin at stage L2 in the interim, the prefix r1 of r with α = viewL(r1) checkwin 2 has final
state (L2,win,⊥). But then we get that the final state of r, after L performs checkwin, is (⊥,win, 1), which
yields an L observation of 1 rather than the final observation 2 of α. This is a contradiction.
If Part Assume there is no winning strategy for player 1 in G. We show that there is no H strategy that
can exclude any L view. To the contrary, assume an L view α that is excluded by an H strategy pi. The
following must hold:
1. The view α contains a checkwin action at stage L2. Indeed, if no checkwin action at stage L2 occurs,
then all L observations in the view must be ⊥. For any such sequence of L actions, there is always a
run consistent with pi yielding L observation ⊥ throughout, so that, contrary to assumption, α is not
excluded by pi.
2. The view α is not of the form α1 checkwin 1(AL 1)
∗, with α1 being a view at stage L2, and containing
no prior checkwin action at stage L2. There is always a run consistent with pi that yields such a view.
There are two possibilities. If the final state s of a run yielding L view α1 is in C × P × B ×M, then
the checkwin action extends this run to one yielding L view α1 checkwin 1 by means of the stage L2
transition
s
checkwin−−−−−−−→ (⊥,win, 1) .
Otherwise, the state s is in C× F, and must be of the form (L2, r,⊥), for r ∈ {win, error}, since there
has not yet been a checkwin at stage L2. In this case, we obtain observation 1 at the next step by
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means of a transition
(L2, r,⊥) checkwin−−−−−−−→ (⊥, r, 1)
for both possible values of r. The resulting states with observation 1 are sinks, so we can extend these
runs to obtain a run with L view α1 checkwin 1(AL 1)
∗. (In either case, we may take the H action in
the final transition to be the action prescribed by pi, since this transition is independent of H.)
It follows that view α is in the regular set α1 checkwin 2(AL 2)
∗, with α1 being a view at stage L2, and
containing no prior checkwin action at stage L2.
Let Λ = λ1λ3 · · ·λN be the player 1 moves of G corresponding to the actions taken by L in α at each L1
stage. (These are the same as the L actions, except that we treat checkwin at stage L1 as corresponding
to Pass.) The sequence Λ is a player 1 strategy in G. This strategy cannot be winning for player 1 as we
have assumed that this player has no winning strategy in G. Thus, there exists some sequence λ2 . . . λN−1
of player 2 moves such that the play
% = ν0
λ1−−→ ν1 λ2−−→ ν2 λ3−−→ . . . λN−−→ νN
is not winning for player 1. Let r1 be a run consistent with pi such that viewL(r1) = α1 and at the m-th
occurrence of stage ⊥, we take the transition
(⊥, i, k, a) τ−→ (H1, i, k′, λ2m)
corresponding to move λ2m by player 2. (The choices of L actions in this run come from α1, and the choices
of H actions are fixed by the strategy pi. The only nondeterminism remaining is in the initial step, where
we choose the plate i to be monitored in the simulation. Since we will work at the level of the H view, any
choice suffices.) Let β1 = viewH(r1) be the H view obtained along this run. Note that by construction of
r1, we obtain that %(β1) = % is the play which is not winning for player 1.
We now argue that the view β1 is truthful and the play %(β1) is also not winning for player 2. More
precisely, we claim that for every prefix β′aHo of β1, we have (1) the action aH = pi(β′) is truthful at β′ and
(2) the play %(β′aHo) is not winning for player 2. We proceed by induction, assuming that β′ is truthful
and %(β′) is not winning for player 2. Note that since %(β′) is also not winning for player 1, we obtain by
Proposition 3 that KH(β
′) = S(c, ν(β′), a) for some c ∈ C and a ∈ M. We consider the possible cases for
the stage c:
1. If c = L1, then %(β
′aHo) = %(β′)
λm−−→ νm for some player 1 move λm. Since %(β′) is not winning for
player 2, an extension by a player 1 move also cannot be winning for player 2. But also aH is trivially
truthful at β′, so both (1) and (2) hold.
2. If c = H0, then %(β
′aHo) = %(β′) is not winning for player 2 by assumption, so we have (2). For (1),
note that if aH = isBlockingj for some j then aH is trivially truthful at β
′. We show that the other
case, where aH = isOpenj for some j, is not possible, because it leads to a contradiction. Note %(β
′)
is also not a winning play for player 1, so ν(β′) is not a winning position for player 1, and there exists
a plate i ∈ P for which not Open1j (i, ν(β′)(i)). This means that for the state s = (c, i, ν(β′)(i), a) ∈
S(c, ν(β′), a) = KH(β′), we have a transition
s
isOpen
j−−−−−−→ (L1, error ,⊥) .
It follows using Proposition 5 that there exists a run r′ ending in state (L1, error ,⊥) with viewH(r′) =
β′aHo and viewL(r′) a prefix of α1. The run r′ is necessarily consistent with pi because β is consistent
with pi. Following the actions dictated for L and H by α1 and pi, respectively, we may extend this to
a longer run r′1, still consistent with pi, with viewL(r
′
1) = α1, also ending in state (L1, error ,⊥). But
then the next checkwin step allows a transition to (⊥, error , 2), and we obtain a run with L view α, a
contradiction.
3. If c = L2, then aH is trivially truthful, and %(β
′aHo) = %(β′) is not winning for player 2 by assumption.
4. For stages c = Hk with k ∈ {1 . . . h2}, we have that %(β′aHo) = %(β′). It is immediate that %(β′aHo) is
not winning for either player, and it remains to show that aH is truthful at β
′.
As noted above, the assumption that β′ is truthful, together with the assumption that %(β′) is not a
winning play for either player, implies that KH(β
′) = S(c, ν(β′), a), by Proposition 3. We will show that
the desired conclusion that aH is truthful at β
′ follows from the weaker assumption that β′ is truthful
and KH(β
′) = S(c, ν(β′), a): this helps with the argument for case c = ⊥, which is handled below.
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Note first that aH cannot be isOpenj , since the final state of the prefix r
′ of r with viewH(r′) = β′
is in S(c, ν(β′), a), hence in C × P × B ×M. so the action isOpenj results in a transition to the state
(next(c), error ,⊥) in r. It follows that the final state of r1 is (L2, error ,⊥), and then the subsequent
action checkwin produces a run consistent with pi with view α, contrary to the assumption that pi
excludes α. Hence aH = isBlockingj for some j.
Suppose that Open2k(j, ν(β
′)(j)). Since KH(β′) = S(c, ν(β′), a), we have that (c, j, ν(β′)(j), a) ∈ KH(β′).
By Proposition 5, there exists a run r′ ending in state (c, j, ν(β′)(j), a) with viewH(r′) = β′ and
viewL(r
′) a prefix of α1. The transition
(c, j, ν(β′)(j), a)
isBlocking
j−−−−−−−−−−→ (next(c), error ,⊥)
extends this to a run whose L view remains a prefix of α1, and by following strategy pi and the remaining
L actions in α1 we may continue to extend to the point where we obtain a run r
′
1 with viewL(r
′
1) = α1
and final state (L2, error ,⊥). But then the next checkwin step allows a transition to (⊥, error , 2), and
we obtain a run consistent with pi with L view α, a contradiction. Thus, in fact, we must have not
Open2k(j, ν(β
′)(j)), so that aH is truthful at β′, as required.
For the purposes of the next case, we make one further conclusion. Note that by definition of the
transitions for isBlockingj at stage Hk, we get from KH(β
′) = S(c, ν(β′), a) that KH(β′aHo) =
S(next(c), ν(β′), o) = S(next(c), ν(β′aHo), o), so we preserve the weakened assumption. Thus, since the
above argument applies for all k = 1 . . . h2, we have that for all such k, there exists j such that not
Open2k(j, ν(β
′)(j)). That is, no hole of player 2 is open in ν(β′). It follows that ν(β′) cannot be a winning
position of player 2.
5. If c = ⊥, then aH is trivially truthful, and %(β′aHo) = %(β′) λm−−→ νm, where o = λm is a move of player
2. As noted above, KH(β
′) = S(c, ν(β′), a) for some a. The transitions for case c = ⊥ then imply that
KH(β
′aHo) = S(c, ν(β′aHo), o). We therefore satisfy the weakened assumption for the stages H1 . . . Hh2
in the previous case. It therefore follows using the argument of the previous case that ν(β′ aH o) = νm
cannot be a winning position of player 2. Thus, from the assumption that %(β′) is not winning for either
player, we obtain that %(β′aHo) is not winning for either player.
This completes the argument that β1 is truthful and %(β1) is not a winning play for either player. By
Proposition 3, we obtain that KH(β1) = S(c, ν(β1), a) for some a. In particular, the final state of r1 must
be in C× P× B×M, and the next checkwin action then results in a run consistent with pi with L view α,
a contradiction. uunionsq
Again, we point out that the hardness result holds for scheduled machines already.
5 Synchronous Bisimulation-based Notions
In this section we establish the result:
Theorem 6 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, RES is in PTIME.
The following Lemma shows that in searching for an unwinding relation on a machine M , it suffices to
consider equivalence relations on the reachable states of M .
Lemma 6
1. If there exists a synchronous unwinding relation on M , then there exists a largest such relation, which
is transitive.
2. If all states in M are reachable then the largest synchronous unwinding relation (if one exists) is an
equivalence relation.
3. A system satisfies RES iff its restriction to its reachable states satisfies RES.
Proof 1. First we show that the set of synchronous unwinding relations on M is closed under union. Let
∼1 and ∼2 be two unwinding relations on M . Clearly Items 1 and 2 of Def. 5 hold for ∼1 ∪ ∼2. Item 3
holds as well as if s ∼1 ∪ ∼2 t then either s ∼1 t or s ∼2 t holds. Assume s ∼1 t, then as ∼1 is an
unwinding relation, by Item 3 of Def. 5, it follows that for all a1, a2 ∈ AH and a3 ∈ AL, if s (a1,a3)−−−−−−→ s′
there is some t′ such that t
(a2,a3)−−−−−−→ t′ and s′ ∼1 t′, which implies s′ ∼1 ∪ ∼2 t′. This implies that
there exists a largest unwinding relation.
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Second, the composition of two unwinding relations is an unwinding relation. Again Items 1 and 2 of
Def. 5 hold for ∼1 ◦ ∼2. Assume s ∼1 ◦ ∼2 t. In this case there is some x such that s ∼1 x and x ∼2 t.
As ∼1 is un unwinding relation, by Item 3 of Def. 5, for any a1, a2 ∈ AH and a3 ∈ AL, if s (a1,a3)−−−−−−→ s′,
there is some x′ such that x
(a2,a3)−−−−−−→ x′ and x′ ∼1 t′. As x ∼2 t, and as ∼2 is an unwinding relation,
Item 3 Def. 5 applied with a1 = a2 implies there exists some t
′ such that t
(a2,a3)−−−−−−→ t′ and x′ ∼2 t′.
Putting it all together, there is some t′ such that t
(a2,a3)−−−−−−→ t′ and some x′ such that s′ ∼1 x′ ∼2 t′
i.e., s′ ∼1 ◦ ∼2 t′.
It follows that the transitive closure of any synchronous unwinding relation is a synchronous unwinding
relation. In particular, the largest such relation must be transitive.
2. Let ∼ be the largest synchronous unwinding relation. By definition and the Item 1 above, we already
have that ∼ is symmetric and transitive, so it suffices to show reflexivity. Let s be a reachable state. In
this case there is a run s0a1s1 . . . ansn of M such that s = sn. We need to show that s ∼ s. The proof
is by induction on the length of the run.
The base case of s0 ∼ s0 is immediate from Item 1 of Def. 5. Suppose si ∼ si, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Assume
sn
an+1−−−−→ sn+1. As sn ∼ sn, and applying Item 3 of Def. 5 to the right handside copy of sn, there
exists a transition sn
an+1−−−−→ s′ for some s′ and si+1 ∼ s′. Because ∼ is symmetric, we have s′ ∼ sn+1,
and by transitivity sn+1 ∼ sn+1.
3. Any synchronous unwinding relation is still a synchronous unwinding relation when restricted to the
reachable states. Conversely, given a synchronous unwinding relation on the reachable states, the (iden-
tical) relation which extends this to all states by union with the empty relation on unreachable states
is also a synchronous unwinding relation. uunionsq
Using Lemma 6, we can design an algorithm to compute the largest synchronous unwinding relation, or
the empty relation if none exists. By part (3) of Lemma 6 we may assume that all the states of the machine
M = 〈S,A, s0,→, O, obs〉 are reachable.
The algorithm is an adaptation of the algorithm for calculating the relational coarsest partition by
Kanellakis and Smolka [KS83]. For a partition P or equivalence relation ≈, we write [s]P or [s]≈ for the
equivalence class containing element s. We say that a partition P of the state space S is stable if the
corresponding equivalence relation ∼P satisfies condition (3) of Def. 5.2 The idea of the algorithm is to
compute the coarsest stable partition satisfying condition (2) of Def. 5, by iteratively refining an existing
partition if the latter is not stable. Given the current partition P , if there exists a (reachable) state s such
that condition (3) of Def. 5 is not satisfied with t = s, the algorithm terminates and returns the empty
relation: this follows from Lemma 6.(2) because reflexivity is a necessary condition for the existence of an
unwinding relation. Otherwise, we check whether it is stable for s 6= t. If it is, we have found the largest
unwinding relation. If not, we refine the current partition based on the counterexample found.
The procedure is given by Algorithm 1. In each refinement step, with the current partition equal to P ,
we first compute the set
R(s, aH , aL) = {[t]P | s (aL,aH)−−−−−→ t}
for each state s, and L action aL and H action aH . Rule (3) with respect to ∼P is equivalent to the
statement that if s ∼P t then R(s, aH , aL) = R(t, a′H , aL) for all L actions aL and H actions aH , a′H .
We first check this when s = t. Note that once this condition has been verified, we have verified that
R(s, aH , aL) does not depend on the second argument aH . To check the non-reflexive cases, it therefore
suffices to check the condition with respect to any fixed aH .
We can now prove Theorem 6:
Proof (of Theorem 6) Algorithm 1 terminates when no split occurs in the main loop. Since, when a split
occurs, the new partition is a strict refinement of the previous one, the number of iterations of the main loop
is at most |S|. For each p ∈ P , computing the function R can be done in time O((|AH |×|AL|×|p|)+|p · −→ |).
Checking the reflexive cases can be done in timeO(|AH |2×|AL|×|p|), and the non-reflexive cases can be done
in time O(|p|2×|AL|). Hence the foreach loop over p ∈ P can be handled in time O(|AH |2×|AL|×|S|2+| −→
|). Since there are at most |S| iterations, we have a total time of O(|AH |2 × |AL| × |S|3 + | −→ | × |S|).
Because | −→ | may be as large as |S|2, this is O(|AH |2 × |AL| × |S|3). (Literature subsequent to Kanellakis
2 Our definition of stability differs from that of Kanellakis and Smolka: they require that for each of a set of functions
fa : S → P(S) (each corresponding to transitions with respect to some label a), and partition p ∈ P , for states s, t ∈ S we
have s ∼P t implies that that fa(s)∩ p = ∅ iff fa(t)∩ p 6= ∅. In this condition, we apply the same function to s and t. Our
definition amounts to the application of different functions to s and t, corresponding to transitions with respect to (a1, a3)
and (a2, a3), respectively.
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Algorithm 1: Compute-Largest-Unwinding(M)
Input: A synchronous machine M = 〈S,A, s0,→, O, obs〉. /* We assume S is reachable */
Output: The largest unwinding partition P on M , or ∅ if none exists
/* Initial partition P is given by the set of L observations */
P ← {obs−1L (o) | o ∈ O};
Loop: /* Check stability of each subset p ∈ P */
foreach p ∈ P do
foreach s ∈ p and (aH , aL) ∈ A do
Let R(s, aH , aL) = {[t]P | s (aH ,aL)−−−−−−→ t};
/* Check reflexive case of condition (3) */
foreach s ∈ p and a3 ∈ AL do
if there exists a1, a2 ∈ AH with R(s, a1, a3) 6= R(s, a2, a3) then
return ∅;
/* R(s, aH , aL) is independent of aH */
Fix aH ∈ AH ;
For s, t ∈ p and a3 ∈ AL let s ≈a3 t when R(s, aH , a3) = R(t, aH , a3);
if there exists s, t ∈ p and a3 ∈ AL with s 6= t and s 6≈a3 t then
/* split p according to equivalence classes [s]≈a3 of ≈a3 */
P ← (P \ {p}) ∪ {[s]≈a3 | s ∈ p};
Go to Loop
/* P contains the largest stable partition */
return P ;
and Smolka has shown how to optimize their algorithm using careful scheduling, union-find data stuctures
and amortized analysis, as well as parallel implementation. Similar optimizations may be applicable to our
algorithm, but we will not pursue this here.)
To argue correctness, we first show that if there exists a synchronous unwinding ∼ on M , corresponding
to partition P∼, the algorithm maintains the invariant that P∼ is a refinement of P . That this holds for
the initial value of P follows from condition (2) of Def. 5. The only case where P changes value is where
we have p ∈ P and a3 ∈ AL with
1. R(s, a1, a3) = R(s, a2, a3) for all s ∈ p and a1, a2 ∈ AH , (there are no reflexivity violations), and
2. R(s, aH , a3) 6= R(t, aH , a3) for some s, t ∈ p and aH ∈ AH .
In this case, we obtain the new value P ′ for P by splitting p into the collection {[s]≈a3 | s ∈ p}, where ≈a3 is
defined on p by s ≈a3 t if R(s, aH , a3) = R(t, aH , a3). Suppose that P∼ is not a refinement of P ′. Since the
only element of P that changed was p, we must have s, t ∈ p with s ∼ t and R(s, aH , a3) 6= R(t, aH , a3). The
latter means that there exists p′ ∈ P with (without loss of generality) p′ ∈ R(s, aH , a3) and p′ 6∈ R(t, aH , a3).
That is, there exists s′ ∈ p′ such that s (aH ,a3)−−−−−→ s′, but for all t′ with t (aH ,a3)−−−−−→ t′ we have t′ 6∈ p′. Because
∼ is a synchronous unwinding, s ∼ t, and s (aH ,a3)−−−−−→ s′, there exists t′ with t (aH ,a3)−−−−−→ t′ and s′ ∼ t′. But
because P∼ refines P , this implies that t′ ∈ [s′]P = p′, a contradiction. We conclude that in fact P ′ refines
P .
The correctness argument now follows straightforwardly. Suppose that the algorithm outputs ∅: we
show that there exists no synchronous unwinding on M . Suppose to the contrary that ∼ is a synchronous
unwinding. At the time the algorithm terminates, we have R(s, a1, a3) 6= R(s, a2, a3) for some p ∈ P , some
s ∈ p and some a1, a2 ∈ AH . Without loss of generality, there exists some p′ ∈ P and t ∈ S such that
s
(a1,a3)−−−−−→ t ∈ p′ but there exists no t′ ∈ p′ such that s (a2,a3)−−−−−→ t′ ∈ p′. By reflexivity of ∼, we have s ∼ s, so
there exists t′ such that s
(a2,a3)−−−−−→ t′ and t ∼ t′. Because P∼ is a refinement of P , we obtain t′ ∈ [t]P = p′,
a contradiction. We conclude that there exists no synchronous unwinding.
Conversely, suppose that the algorithm outputs a partition P 6= ∅, and let ∼P be the corresponding
equivalence relation. Since P is a refinement of {obs−1L (o) | o ∈ O}, we have that s ∼P t implies obsL(s) =
obsL(t), so condition (2) of Def. 5 is satisfied. Moreover, we have, for all p ∈ P , that
1. R(s, a1, a3) = R(s, a2, a3) for all s ∈ p and a1, a2 ∈ AH ,
2. R(s, aH , a3) = R(t, aH , a3) for all s 6= t ∈ p and aH ∈ AH .
Together, these imply that ∼P satisfies condition (3) of Def. 5. Finally, since P is a partition, we have
s0 ∼P s0, so condition (1) also holds. uunionsq
25
6 Related Work
In asynchronous machines the verification complexities of NDI and NDS are both PSPACE-complete, and RES
(based on asynchronous unwinding) is in polynomial time [FG95,FG96,vdMZ07]. Interestingly, PSPACE
is also the complexity result for verifying Mantel’s BSP conditions [Man00a] on asynchronous finite state
systems. For (asynchronous) push-down systems, the verification problem is undecidable [DHK+08].
A number of works have defined notions of security for synchronous or timed systems, but fewer com-
plexity results are known. Ko¨pf and Basin [KB06] define a notion similar to RES and show it is PTIME
decidable. Similar definitions are also used in the literature on language-based security [Aga00,VS97].
Focardi et al. [FGM00] define a spectrum of definitions related to ours in a timed process algebraic
setting, and state a decidability result for one of them, close to our notion NDS. However, this result
concerns an approximation to the notion “timed nondeducibility on compositions” (tBNDC) that is their
real target, and they do not give a complexity result. Beauquier and Lanotte defined covert channels in
timed systems with tick transitions by using strategies [BL06]. They prove that the problem of the existence
of a covert channel in such systems is decidable. However, their definition of covert channel requires that
H and L have strategies to force a system into sets of runs with disjoint sets of L views. The induced
definition on free of covert channels appears to be a weaker notion than NDS.
7 Conclusion
We remarked above that nondeducibility-based notions of security may have the disadvantage that they
do not readily support a compositional approach to secure systems development, motivating the intro-
duction of unwinding-based definitions of security. The complexity results of the present paper can be
interpreted as lending further support to the value of unwinding-based definitions. We have found that the
two nondeducibility notions we have considered, while both decidable, are intractable. On the other hand,
the unwinding-based notion of synchronous restrictiveness has tractable complexity. This makes this defi-
nition a more appropriate basis for automated verification of security. Even if the desired security property
is nondeducibility on inputs or nondeducibility on strategies, it is sufficient to verify that a system satisfies
synchronous restrictiveness, since this is a stronger notion of security. It remains to be seen whether there
is a significant number of practical systems that are secure according to the nondeducibility-based notions,
but for which there does not exist a synchronous unwinding. If so, then an alternate methodology needs to
be applied for the verification of security for such systems.
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